Ripple Ledger and XRP

Version: 1.0

Authors: David Cervigni

Executive Summary

This section contains an executive summary of the identified threats and their mitigation status

There are 6 unmitigated threats without proposed operational controls.

Threats Summary

This section contains an executive summary of the threats and their mitigation status

There are a total of 6 identified threats of which 6 are not fully mitigated by default, and 6 are unmitigated without proposed operational controls.

Threat IDCVSSValid when (condition)Fully mitigatedHas Operational
countermeasures
RippleXRP.
NETWORK_FORK_UNL_DIVERGENCE 		8.7 (High) Always valid ❌ No
RippleXRP.
VALIDATOR_COLLUSION_ATTACK 		8.1 (High) Always valid ❌ No
RippleXRP.
UNL_MANIPULATION_CENSORSHIP 		7.7 (High) Always valid ❌ No
RippleXRP.
NETWORK_SPAM_DOS 		4.3 (Medium) Always valid ❌ No
RippleXRP.
RIPPLE_CENTRALIZATION_RISK 		4.1 (Medium) Always valid ❌ No
RippleXRP.
XRP_MARKET_MANIPULATION 		3.8 (Low) Always valid ❌ No

Ripple Ledger and XRP - scope of analysis

Overview

This threat model focuses on the Ripple/XRP ecosystem, specifically examining the security properties and potential threats related to the XRP Ledger (XRPL) technology, the XRP digital asset, and the interactions between key participants including users, validators, and Ripple (the company). It considers the unique aspects of the XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol (RPCA) based on Unique Node Lists (UNLs) and the implications for decentralization, censorship resistance, and ledger integrity. The model distinguishes between Ripple the company, the open-source XRPL, and the XRP asset.

Ripple Ledger and XRP security objectives

Core Ledger Security:

Operational Security:

Network Properties:

Asset Protection:

Diagram: Details:

Censorship Resistance (CENSORSHIP_RESISTANCE)

Ensure the network's ability to process valid transactions without undue interference or blocking based on sender, receiver, or transaction content.

Priority: High

Attack tree:

Ledger Consistency (LEDGER_CONSISTENCY)

Ensure all participating nodes agree on the state of the validated ledger.

Priority: High

Attack tree:

Ledger Integrity (LEDGER_INTEGRITY)

Ensure the XRP Ledger accurately reflects all validated transactions, prevents double-spending, and maintains a consistent, immutable history.

Priority: High

Attack tree:

Network Availability (AVAILABILITY)

Ensure the XRP Ledger network remains operational, processes valid transactions promptly, and is resilient to disruptions.

Priority: High

Attack tree:

Network Decentralization (DECENTRALIZATION)

Ensure control over the network (consensus, development, rules) is sufficiently distributed to prevent single points of failure or control.

Priority: High

Attack tree:

Transaction Finality (TRANSACTION_FINALITY)

Ensure that once a transaction is validated and included in a ledger, it is final and cannot be reversed or altered (typically within 3-5 seconds).

Priority: High

Attack tree:

XRP Asset Security (ASSET_SECURITY)

Protect the XRP asset from theft, unauthorized creation, and significant market manipulation that undermines its utility.

Priority: High

Attack tree:

Ripple Ledger and XRP Threat Actors

Actors, agents, users and attackers may be used as synonymous.

Standard unauthenticated network attacker attempti[...] (EXTERNAL_ATTACKER)
Description:

Standard unauthenticated network attacker attempting to exploit network protocols or public interfaces.

In Scope as threat actor:

Yes

An operator of a validator node attempting to disr[...] (MALICIOUS_VALIDATOR)
Description:

An operator of a validator node attempting to disrupt consensus, double-spend (if possible), censor transactions, or gain unfair advantages.

In Scope as threat actor:

Yes

An XRPL user attempting to spam the network, explo[...] (MALICIOUS_USER)
Description:

An XRPL user attempting to spam the network, exploit ledger features maliciously, or defraud others.

In Scope as threat actor:

Yes

An attacker focusing on network-level attacks like[...] (NETWORK_MANIPULATOR)
Description:

An attacker focusing on network-level attacks like partitioning, BGP hijacking, or large-scale DoS against validators.

In Scope as threat actor:

Yes

A government or regulatory body attempting to enfo[...] (REGULATOR_OR_STATE_ACTOR)
Description:

A government or regulatory body attempting to enforce censorship, surveillance, or control over the network or its participants through legal or coercive means.

In Scope as threat actor:

Yes

Ripple (the company) potentially acting in its own[...] (RIPPLE_COMPANY)
Description:

Ripple (the company) potentially acting in its own commercial interest, which might conflict with broader ecosystem decentralization, neutrality, or lead to market influence via its XRP holdings.

In Scope as threat actor:

Yes

Assumptions

CRYPTOGRAPHY_SOUNDNESS

Standard cryptographic primitives used (ECDSA, Ed25519, SHA-512) are computationally secure against current threats.

PUBLIC_NETWORK

The XRP Ledger operates over the public internet and is accessible to anyone.

VALIDATOR_RATIONALITY

Validators are generally rational actors motivated by maintaining network health for their own benefit (reputation, business reliance), though some may act maliciously.

UNL_DEPENDENCE

The security and liveness of the network consensus heavily depend on the quality, diversity, and overlap of the UNLs chosen by operators.

RIPPLE_INFLUENCE

Ripple (the company) retains significant influence over the core codebase development and historically shaped the default UNL, impacting perceived decentralization.

Assets

Summary Table

Title(ID)TypeIn Scope
XRP Ledger
XRPL 		system ✔️
XRP Digital Asset
XRP 		data ✔️
Validator Nodes
VALIDATORS 		system ✔️
Unique Node List (UNL)
UNL 		data ✔️
XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol (RPCA)
RPCA_CONSENSUS 		process ✔️
XRPL Transactions
TRANSACTIONS 		dataflow ✔️
User Accounts
USER_ACCOUNTS 		system ✔️
Ripple's XRP Escrow Mechanism
RIPPLE_ESCROW 		system ✔️

Details

XRP Ledger (system in scope - ID: XRPL)

The distributed, open-source ledger technology itself.

XRP Digital Asset (data in scope - ID: XRP)

The native cryptocurrency of the XRP Ledger.

Validator Nodes (system in scope - ID: VALIDATORS)

Servers running the XRPL software that participate in the consensus process.

Unique Node List (UNL) (data in scope - ID: UNL)

The list of validators trusted by a specific node operator for consensus. Includes the concept of the default UNL (dUNL).

XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol (RPCA) (process in scope - ID: RPCA_CONSENSUS)

The federated consensus algorithm used by the XRPL.

XRPL Transactions (dataflow in scope - ID: TRANSACTIONS)

Operations submitted to the ledger (payments, account settings, DEX orders, etc.).

User Accounts (system in scope - ID: USER_ACCOUNTS)

Entities on the ledger holding XRP and interacting with the network.

Ripple's XRP Escrow Mechanism (system in scope - ID: RIPPLE_ESCROW)

The on-ledger mechanism holding a significant portion of Ripple's XRP supply, releasing it periodically.

Ripple Ledger and XRP Analysis

The XRP Ledger presents a unique set of trade-offs compared to traditional PoW or PoS blockchains. Its Federated Byzantine Agreement (RPCA) consensus mechanism enables high speed, low cost, and scalability, making it suitable for payments. However, this design relies on trusted validator lists (UNLs), introducing potential centralization vectors and weaker censorship resistance compared to more decentralized networks. Ripple's significant XRP holdings and historical influence over development and the default UNL are key factors in the threat landscape, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest, market manipulation, and the practical level of decentralization. Mitigations rely heavily on validator diversity, independent UNL curation (e.g., by XRPLF), transparent processes, and economic incentives aligning validators with network health.

Ripple Ledger and XRP Attack tree

Ripple Ledger and XRP Threats

Note This section contains the threat and mitigations identified during the analysis phase.

Excessive Influence by Ripple Company (RIPPLE_CENTRALIZATION_RISK)

Threat actors:
Threat Description

Ripple leverages its large XRP holdings (including escrow), primary role in core rippled development, and historical influence over the default UNL to potentially steer network direction, prioritize features beneficial to its business, influence consensus outcomes indirectly, or exert undue market influence through XRP sales.

Impact

Erosion of network decentralization, potential for governance decisions favoring Ripple's interests over the broader community, increased risk of perceived or actual conflicts of interest, potential for market instability due to large XRP sales, and a potential single point of pressure for regulatory actions.
DECENTRALIZATION
CENSORSHIP_RESISTANCE
ASSET_SECURITY

CVSS
Base score: 4.1 (Medium)
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Counter-measures for RIPPLE_CENTRALIZATION_RISK

INDEPENDENT_VALIDATORS Promote Independent Validator Ecosystem

Encourage and support a diverse set of validators operated by independent entities globally to dilute the influence of any single party.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

XRPLF_DUNL_MANAGEMENT Independent dUNL Curation

Utilize the XRP Ledger Foundation (XRPLF) or a similar independent body to manage the default UNL based on transparent, objective criteria, reducing Ripple's direct control over the recommended validator set.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

COMMUNITY_GOVERNANCE Robust Community Governance and Code Review

Foster active community participation in protocol upgrades (Amendments), code reviews, and governance discussions to counterbalance corporate influence.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

XRP_ESCROW_TRANSPARENCY Transparent XRP Escrow Management

Maintain the on-ledger, cryptographically secured escrow mechanism with predictable monthly releases and public reporting of Ripple's XRP sales to provide market transparency.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

UNL Manipulation Leading to Censorship (UNL_MANIPULATION_CENSORSHIP)

Threat actors:
Threat Description

A powerful entity (e.g., state actor, colluding group) coerces or conspires with the entity managing the dominant UNL (e.g., XRPLF) and/or directly with a supermajority (>80%) of validators on commonly used UNLs to systematically exclude specific transactions from validation based on predefined criteria (e.g., non-KYC'd addresses, specific jurisdictions).

Impact

Legitimate transactions are prevented from being included in the ledger, undermining the network's censorship resistance and neutrality. Could potentially lead to network instability or forks if operators resist.
CENSORSHIP_RESISTANCE
AVAILABILITY
LEDGER_INTEGRITY

CVSS
Base score: 7.7 (High)
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

Counter-measures for UNL_MANIPULATION_CENSORSHIP

DIVERSE_UNL_CHOICE Encourage Operator UNL Diversity

Node operators should actively curate their own UNLs, selecting diverse, geographically distributed, and demonstrably independent validators, rather than solely relying on the default list.

Countermeasure in place? ❌ Public and disclosable? ✔

VALIDATOR_DIVERSITY_GEOGRAPHIC Promote Validator Diversity

Foster a wide range of validator operators across different legal jurisdictions and organizational types (companies, universities, individuals) to make widespread collusion or coercion more difficult.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

TRANSPARENT_DUNL_CRITERIA Transparent dUNL Management Criteria

The body managing the dUNL (e.g., XRPLF) should operate transparently with clear, objective criteria for validator inclusion and removal, resisting external pressure.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

COMMUNITY_MONITORING_CENSORSHIP Community Monitoring for Censorship

The community should actively monitor validator behavior and transaction inclusion patterns to detect potential censorship attempts early.

Countermeasure in place? ❌ Public and disclosable? ✔

Network Fork Due to Divergent UNLs (NETWORK_FORK_UNL_DIVERGENCE)

Threat actors:
Threat Description

Significant portions of the network adopt non-overlapping or minimally overlapping UNLs, causing disjoint sets of validators to reach the >80% consensus threshold independently, resulting in conflicting validated ledger histories (a fork). This could occur accidentally due to misconfiguration or be induced by an attacker sowing distrust.

Impact

Loss of global ledger consistency, conflicting transaction histories, potential for double-spends across forks, disruption of services relying on the ledger, requires complex off-chain coordination to resolve.
LEDGER_CONSISTENCY
AVAILABILITY
LEDGER_INTEGRITY
TRANSACTION_FINALITY

CVSS
Base score: 8.7 (High)
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

Counter-measures for NETWORK_FORK_UNL_DIVERGENCE

DUNL_COORDINATION_MECHANISM Default UNL as Coordination Point

The existence of a widely trusted default UNL (dUNL) serves as a crucial coordination mechanism, ensuring sufficient overlap among most validators' chosen UNLs to prevent accidental forks under normal conditions.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

INCENTIVES_FOR_MAINNET_CONSENSUS Economic and Operational Incentives

Validators and operators are strongly incentivized (economically, operationally) to maintain consensus with the majority network, as being on a minority fork renders their operations largely useless.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

FORK_DETECTION_PROTOCOL Protocol-Level Fork Detection

The XRPL software includes mechanisms for nodes to detect loss of synchronization and consensus failures, preventing them from following an invalid or minority fork indefinitely.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

COMMUNITY_FORK_RESOLUTION Off-Chain Community Coordination

Established communication channels within the XRPL community allow for coordination among operators to resolve forks if they occur.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

Validator Collusion for Malicious Actions (VALIDATOR_COLLUSION_ATTACK)

Threat actors:
Threat Description

A colluding group controlling >80% of the validating power on widely used UNLs attempts to perform malicious actions beyond simple censorship, such as attempting to double-spend (requires rewriting recent history, very difficult but theoretically possible for a short window), preventing all transactions (DoS), or forcing through harmful protocol amendments.

Impact

Potential loss of funds for users, complete network standstill, erosion of trust in the consensus mechanism, or forced adoption of detrimental protocol changes.
LEDGER_INTEGRITY
AVAILABILITY
ASSET_SECURITY
TRANSACTION_FINALITY

CVSS
Environmental score: 8.1 (High)
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Counter-measures for VALIDATOR_COLLUSION_ATTACK

VALIDATOR_DIVERSITY_REPUTATION_INCENTIVES Validator Diversity, Reputation, and Incentives

Relies on the difficulty of achieving >80% collusion across diverse, reputable validators who have economic and reputational incentives to maintain network integrity.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

UNL_CONFIGURATION_TRUST Prudent UNL Configuration by Operators

Node operators selecting trustworthy, reliable, and independent validators for their UNLs is a critical defense layer.

Countermeasure in place? ❌ Public and disclosable? ✔

AMENDMENT_VOTING_THRESHOLD High Threshold and Duration for Amendments

Protocol changes (Amendments) require sustained >80% validator support over a period (e.g., two weeks), making it harder to force through malicious changes quickly.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

CRYPTOGRAPHIC_TRANSACTION_VERIFICATION Cryptographic Transaction Validation

Even colluding validators cannot forge signatures or violate fundamental cryptographic rules of transactions; they can primarily only control inclusion/ordering.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

Market Manipulation via Large XRP Holdings/Sales (XRP_MARKET_MANIPULATION)

Threat actors:
Threat Description

Ripple, or another entity holding a very large amount of XRP, strategically sells or moves large volumes on the open market, potentially causing significant price volatility, triggering stop-losses, creating FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt), or influencing market sentiment for their own gain.

Impact

Financial losses for XRP holders, damage to the ecosystem's reputation and perceived stability, potential reduction in XRP's utility as a reliable bridge currency if volatility becomes excessive. Does not directly compromise ledger integrity but affects the asset's value proposition.
ASSET_SECURITY
AVAILABILITY

CVSS
Base score: 3.8 (Low)
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Counter-measures for XRP_MARKET_MANIPULATION

PROGRAMMATIC_ESCROW_RELEASES Predictable Escrow Releases

The scheduled, on-ledger release of XRP from Ripple's escrow provides some predictability regarding potential new supply hitting the market, though Ripple controls sales post-release.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

RIPPLE_SALES_REPORTING Ripple's Voluntary Sales Transparency

Ripple publishes quarterly reports detailing its programmatic and institutional XRP sales, providing some transparency to the market.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

MARKET_SURVEILLANCE_EXCHANGES Exchange Market Surveillance

Cryptocurrency exchanges employ market surveillance tools to detect and potentially mitigate overtly manipulative trading practices.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

WIDER_XRP_DISTRIBUTION Encourage Wider XRP Distribution Over Time

A long-term mitigation involves the gradual distribution of XRP to a broader base of holders, reducing the market impact of any single large seller.

Countermeasure in place? ❌ Public and disclosable? ✔

Network Spam/Denial-of-Service via Transaction Flooding (NETWORK_SPAM_DOS)

Threat actors:
Threat Description

An attacker submits a massive volume of valid, low-value transactions to the network, attempting to consume validator resources (bandwidth, CPU, storage), increase ledger size unnecessarily, or potentially slightly degrade overall transaction processing performance during the flood.

Impact

Increased operational costs for validators, potential for slight increase in transaction confirmation times if the network is pushed to its limits, ledger bloat over the long term.
AVAILABILITY

CVSS
Base score: 4.3 (Medium)
Vector:CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Counter-measures for NETWORK_SPAM_DOS

TRANSACTION_FEE_BURN Transaction Fee Destruction (XRP Burn)

Every transaction destroys a small amount of XRP. This makes submitting millions of spam transactions prohibitively expensive for the attacker.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

DYNAMIC_FEE_ESCALATION Dynamic Fee Escalation Under Load

The minimum required transaction fee automatically increases as network load rises, further increasing the cost for attackers during a flood attempt.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

ACCOUNT_RESERVE_REQUIREMENT Minimum Account Reserve

Each account must maintain a minimum XRP balance (currently 10 XRP) that cannot be spent, discouraging the creation of millions of spam accounts.

Countermeasure in place? ✔ Public and disclosable? ✔

Requests For Information

    Operational Security Hardening Guide

    SeqCountermeasure Details

    Testing guide

    This guide lists all testable attacks described in the threat model

    SeqAttack to testPass/Fail/NA

    Keys classification